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MICHIGAN

LAW REVIEW
Vor.. XVII.

JUNE, 1919

No. 8

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS IN WAR
TIME: THE ESPIONAGE ACT.
HE Imperial German Government had never made a secret of
its willingness to encourage disloyalty among the citizens and
subjects of Germany's enemies. It had officially announced:
"Bribery of enemies' subjects, acceptance of offers of treachery,
utilization of discontented elements in the population, support of
pretenders and the like are permissible; indeed, international law
is in no way opposed to the exploitation of the crimes of third
parties."1 ·
Before our own entrance into the war, othei; governments had
discovered that German propaganda was a real menace and had
taken action accordingly. The Governor-General of Canada, for
example, under authority of the War-Measures Act of 1914, had
issued dractic regulations.2
•

T

• The following discussion is preliminary to a more extended treatment of the subject which the author is preparing under the direction of Prof. E. S. Corwin, of Princeton University.
1 German War Book-Morgan Tral_lSlation-Page
2 I~ shall be an offense (a) To print, publish, or pnbffcly exprcsS any adversf or un·
favourable statement, report, or opinion concerning the causes of the present war or"the
motives or purposes for which Canada or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland or any of the Allied nations entered upon or prosecute the same, which may tend
to arouse hostile feeling, create unrest, or unsettle or influence public opinion.
(b) To print, publish, or publicly express any adverse or unfavourable statement,
report, or opinion concerning the action of Canada or the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland or any of the allied nations in prosecuting the war.
(c) To print etc., any report etc., respecting the work or activities .of any depart·
ment, branch or officer of the public service or the service or activities of Canada's mill·
tary or naval forces, which may tend to inflame public opinion and thereby hamper the
Government of Canada or prejudicially affect its military or naval forces in the prosecu·
tion of the war.
··
(d) To print etc., any report of any secret session of the House of Commons or
to refer to any secret session of the House of Commons or Senate held in pursuance

as.
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The problem that confronted the United States, when it became
evident that we could not avoid wa:r, was to meet the German attempts to arouse disloyalty among the citizens of the United States,
and at· the same time to keep within the limits of the authority
conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.
.
The first legislation was clearly within the power of Congress.
Early in February, 1917, both houses passed, almost without debate,
the following ·bill :
.
'
"Any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or causes
to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery
from any post office or 'by any letter carrier any letter, paper,
· writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to
take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of
the United Stat~s, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise
makes any such threat, shall upon conviction be fined not exceding $1,000.00 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or
both."8
I.
THIS CENSORSHIP PROVISION•

.But the broader problem of thwarting German propaganda still
retnained, and, in February, 1917, the Attorney General recommended that legislation supplementary to the National Defense Act
of March 3, 19u, be enacted. Accordingly, Mr. Overman introduc~d a measure into the Senate designed to give the President
power to issue certain rules governing the publication of information which might be useful to an enemy of tqe United States.' Two
of a resolution passed by the said House or Senate, except such report thereof as may
be officially communicated through the director of public information.
(e) Without lawful authority to r-ublish the contents of any confidential document
belonging to, or any confidential information obtained from, any Governmental depart•
ment or any person in the service of His Majesty.
(0 Any person found guilty of an offense hereunder shall upon (summary) con·
viction, be 'liable to a fine not exceeding $s,ooo, or to imprisonment for not more than
five years, or ooth fine and imprisonment.
Gcingressional Record 65 Cong., :znd sess., p. 6516 (May 4, 1918) •
.. C. R., 64th Congress (House Record 15314), p. :z972, Feb. 6, 1917.
• "Whoever, in time of war, in violation of regulations to be prescribed by the Pres·
ident, which he is hereby authorized 'o make and promulgate, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any' information with respect to the movements,
number,S, description, condition or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aeroplanes, or war mat!!rials of the U. S., or with re5pect to the plans or ~onduct, or suP.
posed plans or conduct, of any military or naval operation, or with respect to any works
or measures undertaken for or connected with or intended for the fqrtification or de·
fense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, or calcu·
lated to be or which might be useful to the· enemy, shalt be punished by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or both by such fine
and imprisonment. C. R. 64th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 31-.t:z. Feb. 8, 1917 (S. 8148).
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days later the same bill was introduced into the House by Mr. Webb.
The bill passed the Senate within a week after it had been reported,
by a vote of 6o to IO, with 20 not voting. The rush of business,
however, prevented its consideration in the House at this session,
and it did not reach a vote.
·
On April 2, 1917, Mr. Culberson of Texas introduced the socalled Espionage Bill into the Senate. It was stated that originally
the Senate committee had tried to frame such a bill in accordance
with the wishes of the Department of Justice, but that, failing to
construct a satisfactory measure, they had called upon Assisfant
Attorney General Warren,.who had prepared seventeen bills .covering the subjects on which legislation was desired. After cutting
these bills down to fourteen, the Committee combined them into
the Espionage Bill. Of the many proyisions of the bill, I shall
deal first with subsection ( c), Section 2, Title I, which reads as
follows:
"Whoever, in time of war-, in violation of regulations to
be prescribed by the President, which he is hereby authorized to make and promulgate, shall collect, record, publish,
or communicate or attempt to elicit any information . with
respect to the movements, numbers, description, condition,
or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aeroplanes,
or war materials of the United States, or with respect to
the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct, of any
naval or military operations, or with respect to any works
or measures undertaken for or connected with the fortifi-.
cation or defense of any place, or any other information i:elating to the public defense or calculated- to be or which
might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by a fine
of not more than $10,000.00 or by imprisonment for not
more thap. ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment;
provided;" that nothing in this section shall be construed to·
limit or restrain any discussion, comment or criticism of the
acts or policies of the Government, or its representatives, or
the publications of the same; provided, no discussion, comment or criticism shall convey information prohibited under
this section.?'11
Though in content this section was virtually the same as the
measure which had received the approval of the Senate at the close
of the previous session, and though it was stamped from the out'65th Cong., 1st Session 1917, p. 766.
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set with the imprimatur of the Administration;6 its appearance
was a signal for a violent outburst on the· part of certain newspapers, which at once jumped to the conclusion that a censorship
of the press was .to be attempted. Said the MILWAUK:£:£ N£ws,
which had recently adopted the slogan of "Follow:. the President":
"The Censorship bill •
• has aroused such a storm of q.isapproval that 1;he Presidenf seeks to allay popular indignation at
this glaring attempt to void Constitutional rights.
The
whole program to muzzle the press seems to smack of unconstitutionality, tyranny, and deceit." 7 The N£w YoRK TIM:£S, too, was
greatly alarmed, and devoted a considerable part of its editorial
space·throughout several days to criticism of.the measure and especially of its alleged unco~stitutionality.8 On the other hand, the
Ou':L'LOOK, ordinarily no friendly critic of the Administration, came
to the defense of the measure, ·saying: "The country has a right
to protect itself •· • · . by prohibiting the publication of any information which will .do injury to the country and give aid and
comfort to its enemies."9
The same division of opinion appeared in ~ongress. Here the
opponents of the '~Censorship Section," of wJ:iom Senator Borah
was· the priricipal spokesmari, raised three constitutional objections:
(I) That it proposed an unconstitutional delegation of power of
legislation to the President; (2) that it denied trial by jury as x:,e• l{y

DEAK MR. Wna:7
I have been very much surprised to find several of ·the public prints stating that
the administration .113d abandoned the position which it so distinctly took, and still holds,
tbat authority to exercise censorship over tbe press, to the extent that tbat censorship
is .embodied in tbe recent action of the House of Representatives is absolutely necessary
for tbe protection of tbe Nation. :i; have every confidence tbat the great majority of tbe
newspapers of tbc country will observe a patriotic retic~nce abont everything whose publication could be of injury, but in every _country tbere are some persons in a position
to do mischief in tbis field who can not be relied upon, and whose interests or dcSircs
will lead to action on tbcir part highly dangerous to tbe nation in the midst of a war.
I want to say again that it seems to me imperatil'C that powers of this sort should be
granted.
·
·
Cordially and sincerely yours,
•

/

WooDROw WILSON.

C. R., 65th Cong., Jst Sess., p. 3343, May 3J, J9J7. See also Brisbane letter, C. R.,
.6stb Cong., Jst Sess, p. J7o8.
T Milwaukee NeTIJ.r, April 30, J9J7.
.
• NeTIJ York Times, April JO, JgJ7. Sec also, April J3, J6, Jg, 20, 22, 23, 24; May
3, 4' ;;.
• O!'fl.,ok, May 9, JgJ7. C. R., 65tb Cong., ±st Scss., p. 223J, May n, Jg17."
19 Revised ~tatutcs, Sec. 5388, C-3, p. J044Said tbe Court: "But the authority
to -make administrative rules is not a d~egation of legislative power, nor are such rules
raised from an administrative to a legislative character because tbe violation tbereof is
punished as a public offense." U. S. v. Grima11c1, 220 U. S. 52J (J9u). See also
Fielcl v. Clarke, J43 U. S. 649.
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quired by the Constitution; (3) that it effected an unconstitutional
abridgement of the freedom of the press. Let us consider these
points in turn.
(I) Would the power to issue rules within the scope of this
bill have been an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?
The courts have repeatedly held that Congress has a right to delegate the power of determining ·some fact or state of thing~ upon
which the operation of a law may be made to depend, and on this
ground a very broad delegation of power to the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules governing the use by renters of the public
grazing lands was recently upheld.10 With such adjudications as
a basis, and in further consideration of the fact that the Commanderin-Chief of the military forces has a right to issue rules· to safe·guard his forces, we may agree with the Administration leaders
in holding that the section did 'not attempt an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
(2) Did the sub-section provide a fair and impartial jury trial?
The opponents of "censorship" made the point that the only question
left to the jury would be the fact of publication, and not whether
such news would be of any value to the enemy. They also charged
that a change of venue could be had whenever the Government
desired it. But had these been their real objections to the measure
the amendments offered by Mr. Gard in the House11 and by Mr.
Ashurst in the Senate12 must have removed their opposition. As
it was, Mr. Ashurst's amendment was voted down in the Senate
largely by the opponents of the sub-section themselves.
(3) We are brought, therefore, to the question whether the
"censorship" provision would have violated constitutional freedom
of the press. Amendment I of the Constitution reads as follows:
"Co':lgress shall make no law • • • abridging the freedom of
the press." At·. the time of the Amendment's adoption there was
little controversy as to the meaning of these words. Blackstone
had announced the doctrine that the liberty of the press "consists
11 The pertinent part of the Gard Amendment reads as follows: " * * * In any pros·
ecution hereunder the jury trying the case shall determine not only whether the defend·
ant or defendants did willfully and without proper authority publish the information (rclat·
ing to the national defense) * * * but also whether such information was of such a char·
.acter as to be useful to the enemy * • *" Full text see C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess.; p.
1858, May 4, 1917.
22 Ashurst Amendment:
"Whoever, in time of war, shall furnish any information
with respect to the mov.ements, etc. * * * of the armed forces, etc. • * * shall be pun·
ished; provided that in any prosecution the jury shall determine whether such information was caleulated to be useful to the enemies of the U. S." C. R., 6sth Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 2139, Ma:r 9, 1917.
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in laying no previous restraint on publications, and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matters when published." "Every freeman," he had declared, "has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this is to destroy the
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or
· offensive writings, which, when published, shall upon fair and im·partial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for
the preserv~tion of the peace and good order, of government arid
religion, the only foundations of civil liberty."13
The Congressional debaters agreed generally that this was the
'test of the freedom of the press at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. The point on which they disagreed was whether subsection ( c) really gave the President the power of establishing a
censorship of the press. But Senator B~rah contended further that
such rules as the Pre!?ident would be authorized to make under
this bill would constitute a violation of the freedom of the press,
even if, as was prob<ible, no actual board of censors was established,
a proposition, however, for whiCh he was able to adduce no real
authority.u
The defenders of the sub-section, admitting that Amendment I
was meant to operate in time of war as well as in time of peace,
denied that it ·was the intention of the Administration to establish
a board of censors.15 Indeed, said Senator Overman, the rules to
·:is Cooley's Blackstone, Bk lV, pp. x51-152.
See also Rex v. Cuthill, 27 St. Trials
675; Patterson v. Colora<lo, 205 U. S. 454; Dicey, Laws of the Constitution, 8th ed., p.
a42; Cawan v. Fairbrother, 24 S. E. Rep. 212.
Mr. Gilbert E. Roe, Amicus Curiae in the case of Peterson v • . u. S. (Oct., x918),
contends at length that Blackstone's definition of "freedom of the press" was not the
generally accepted one at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Mr. Roe reaches
this conclusion from a consideration of (1) The address by the Continental Congress to
the inhabitants of Quebec. (2) The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. (3) The Virginia
Report x799-1800. (4) The pardoning of all convicted under the Sedition Act of x798.
(5) The discussjon of Blackstone by Tucker, quoted below in part.
The author's view is that Blackstone's definition was probably not accepted unani·
mou~ly by the framers of the Constitution; but was adopted later by the Courts.
Justice Holmes, in Sclienk v. U. S., says on this point: "It well may be that the
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints,
although to prevent them may have been its main purpose * * *" Bulletin 194.
>< In support of this position Mr. Siegel quoted, as if it had been a judicial decision,
the following words of the attorney for the defense (Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan): The
history which precedes the First Amendment shows clearly that it was made to prevent
a censorship of the press, either by anticipation through a licensing system or retrospec·
tion by obstruction or punishment." 229 U. S., 292 (1913).
He might have found better authority in Tucker (2 Tucker-Blackstone Commentaries,
App. 20), where the author says: "The security of the freedom of the press requires
that it shall be exempt, not only from pre7!ious restraint by the executive * * * but from
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·be laid down by the President, instead of being a previous restraint,
would in reality be beneficial to the press ; . for they would give
information as to what could be published with impunity. They
would thus allow the press a greater latitude than a voluntary
agreement plan possibly could; since the papers could publish, without fear of punishment, anything that was not prohibited by the
;rules, and also anything prohibited by them provided the publisher
was willing to take the consequences.
The real question, therefore, was whether any real restraint
could be laid upon publication in war time. National safety, said
the supporters of the measure, makes congressional action valid,
provided the action taken be taken in good faith tQ prevent a subversion of govemment.16 Thus, even Madison had owned that it
was "vain to oppose constitutional ·barriers to the impulse of selfpreservation."17 "The question," said Senator Fall, "as to whether
or not this is necessary legislfition is a question of policy. We may
well
differ on that. To deny, however, the power of this
government to do anything necessary for its preservation is to deny
the work of our forefathers, and it is to deny the work of the men
who saved the Union under Abraham Lincoln."18
Thus the way was paved for the more positive argument that
the war power of Congress extends to a control over the press, if
such control is necessary to carry the war to a successful conclusion, and that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the military
forces, is the best judge of such necessity.
·
In support of this position, the advocates of the sub-section were
able to quote various judicial dicta, for instance, that "Congress
legislative restraint also; and that this exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption
not only from previous inspection of licenses, but from subsequent penalty of law.''
11 Representative Kahn, however, introduced an amendment providing for a board
of censors to be composed of one member from each of the following: Department of
State, Navy, An:r<y, ;ind four newspaper editors. C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., May 4,
1917. Mr. Kahn's purpose seems to have been to make the bill so drastic as to bring
about its defeat. See his speech of May 3. C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1794Senator Thomas objected that it was only in time of war that these great constitu·
tional limitations upon despotism are put to test. C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 774
See also Ex Parle Milligan, 4 Wall.
·
"Story says: "The language of this Amendment imports no more than that a man
shall have a right to speak. write or print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever,
without auy prior restraint, so always, that he does not injure any other person in his
rights, person, property or reputation; and so always, that he does not thereby disturb
the public peace or attempt to subvert the Government." Story "Commentaries," 1851
ed., pp. 597-598.
Sec also Roberls:m v. Balt!win, 165 U. S. 275; State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18.
1tMadison Papers, No. 41.
u C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 844.
""Ex Parle Milligan, 4 Wall. See also Whiting, ''War Powers," p. 163.
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has the power to provide by law for carrying on war and that this
power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of the war with vigor and success, (;!Xcept such as interfere
with the command of forces and conduct of campaigns."19 Pursuing this thought, Mr. Overman urged that "the good of society
is superior to the right of the press to publish what it pleases ;
wherefore, if the activities of newspapers were a hindrance in the
prosecution of the 111ar, their curtailment would not be unconstitutional."20
The weight of the argument clearly lay with the Administration
-leaders. It is true that the language of the sub-section was broad
enough to allow the establishment of a board of censors, and that
an involiintary censorship would, by the ·burden of authority, be
unconstitutional. But was it probable that the President, who has
the advice of the Attorney ·General,· would endanger his authority
by pressing it to such lengths? It is more likely, to say the least,
that his proclamation would only have defined the character of
utterances which would, in his opinion, be useful to the enemy.
Certainly no one can contend that the press has a right to publish
·information useful to the enemy; and if the Presidential rules declarative ·of this matter had been essentially reasonable the courts
would undoubtedly have upheld them. In any case, had the Senate
accepted the Ashurst amendment, which provided. that the jury
should determine whether the facts published were actually of use
to the enemy, there can scarcely be a douht that the constitutionality
of the section would have been sustained.
But argument hardly determined the fate of the measure. Newspapers are politically powerful today,21 and men whose political fortunes are dependent upon their support naturally consider their
attitude toward measures before voting. At least, it is difficult to
account on any other theory for the fact that other sections of the
bill which restricted free speech were passed, while sub-section C
was so vioJently denounced. Also, an examination of the history
"" See in this connection State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18. The principle is laid down
that no one may use his property to the injury of society.
"'The papers finally agreed to a voluntary censorship. Under this agreement, news
is clivid~d into three classes: (1) That which is palpably valuable to the enemy. This
includes the mo;vements of troops and similar topics. (:i) That which is patently not
valuable to the enemy. Articles descriptive of battles, of progress in naval and aviation
construction fall in this class. (3) Doubtful topics. The editors submit doubtful matter
to the Committee of Public. Information before publication. Articles criticizing the ad·
ministration are exempt from objection on that score. Attacks upon Mr. Creel, the
civilian chairman, have minimized the board's influence. The censorship board was established by proclamation of President Wilson on A]lril 14. 1917.
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of the bill will show that every effort was made to eliminate the
features most objected to, with the result that, in the end, the opposition were forced to admit their hostility to the sub-section in
any form whatsoever. The entire discussion may well be termed
a "Tempest in a Tea-pot," a "Much Ado About Noth~ng."

ir.
Excr,usION ~OM 'tHE

MAII,S.

The control over the press of the country, which was denied the
Administration when sub-section C was voted down, was presently
obtained under Title XII of the Espionage Act, which in its final
form reads as follows:
"Every letter, writing, circular, postal 'card, picture, print,
engraving, photograph, newspaper, pamphlet, ·book, or other
publication, matter or thing of any kind in violation of any
of the provisions of this Act is hereby declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or
delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
"Sec. 2. Every letter, writing, circular, postal card, picture, print, engraving, photograph, newspaper, . pamphlet,
book, or other publication, matter or thing of any kind containing any JDatter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States
is hereby declared to be non-mailable.
"Sec. 4. Whoever shall use or attempt to use the mails
or the postal ser\Tice of the Government for the transmission
of any matter declared ·by this chapter to be-.non-mailable
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned fo:i; not
more than five years, or both. Any person violating any
provision of this chapter may ·be tried and punished either
in the district in which the unlawful matter or publication
was mailed, or to which it was carried by mail for deliv:ery
according to the direction thereon, or in which it was caused
to be delivered by mail to the person to whom it was addressed."22
Secs. 3 and s were stricken out. They read as follows:
"Sec. 3. The Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any
person, firm, association or company is using the mails for the circulation or dissemination of any matter by this act declared to be non-mailable, forbid the use of the mails
by any such person, concern, association or company.
"Sec. 5. An order of the Postmaster General forbidding the use of the mails in any
case under the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to review by injunction pro22
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The most notable case that has arisen under Ti~le XII is that of
the MASSES PUBLISHING COMPANY, which is worth more than passing notice in this connection.
The contest ~etween the MAssEs and the authorities began. with
the action of Postmaster Patten of New York in excluding the
August (1917) issue of this periodical from the mails.
Immediately Mr. Rogers, representing the MASSES, called upon
Solicitor General Lam~r of the Postoffice Department to explain
this action. According to Mr. Rogers' report, which, however, is
contradicted by the Postmaster General, no definite objection to
this particular issue of the MASSES was offered by the Department;
but Mr. Rogers was informed that the whole tone of the publication was in violation of the Espionage Act and that its editors would
be liable to prosecution unless they ceased publishing seditious matter, such as the cartoqns which the excluded issue contained. An
inquiry instituted by Representative Meyer London and a protest
signed by Dm;lley Field Malone, George Creel and others is said to
have received no more satisfactory reply than that given to Mr.
Rogers. 23
Recourse was now had to the. courts, and on July 13 Judge
Learned Hand was besought to grant a rule ordering Postmaster
Patten to show cause why he should not be enjoined to release the
MASSES.
Three days later Judge Hand adjourned the hearing pending
investigation and possible settlement of the case out of court, and
on July 17th Morris Hilquit renewed the attempt to get a definite
specification of the kind of matter liable to exclusion from the
mails, contending that the activities of postmasters should be limited to the filing of a claim with the Department of Justice that
periodicals were violating the Espionage Act. Any other course,
he said, was unauthorized by law and constituted an abuse of power
ceedings instituted in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.'' C. R., 65th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1915, May 5, 1917. The revised law is found Stat., 65th Cong., 1st
Sess., .230-231.
23 Mr. Burleson in a letter to Congress said:
"The postmasters at the place of
publication of newspapers and periodicals and postmasters who submit other non-mailable
matter are advised (whe·n matter is found to come within the prohibited clauses under
the law) that it was non-mailable under the act of June 15, 1917. Postmasters are being
instructed to notify each publisher promptly when his publication is •being held at the
post office pending a ruling from the department as to its mailabi!ity. These cases. are
disposed oi as rapidly as possible here. Postmasters submitting such publications are advised by telegraph of the action of the department and the publishers are promptly notified by them of the result." C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6852, Aug. ""• 1917. The
notifications to the publishers were usually expressed in the language of the Espionage
Act and did not give very definite reasons for the exclusion from the mails. See Official
Bulletin, Oct. .27, 1917.
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aimed at the freedom of the press. This protest, however, received
no more attention than had previous ones, Mr. Burleson and Mr.
Herron, his assistant, taking the same ground as before.
The matter was thus thrown into court again, and on July 21
the Postmaster General submitted the definite objections to the
MASSES, alleging that several articles and cartoons were in violation of the Espionage Act. Judge Hand, though admitting that
llie cartoons were "designed to arouse animosity to the draft and
the war," granted an injunction, saying that the articles "did not
counsel resistance to law and therefore did not violate the Espionage Act." 2' He also urged the point that there was no distinction
between non-mailable and indictable matter under the Act.
Counsel for the Department, however, promptly secured from
Judge Hough a temporary stay of injunction on the ground of
error, though, pending the convening of the Circuit Courts of Appeals with power to dispose of the injunction issue, Mr. Patten ·
was required to give bond fo cover a possible damage suit if the
case should be decided against him.
.
Before the Court of Appeals met, Mr. Burleson, in a letter to
the Senate, charged the MASSES with being "a leader in propaganda
to discourage enlistments, prevent subscriptions to Liberty Loans,
and obstruct the draft."25
The editors of the MASSES, however, were not to be warned
from their course. The September issue was written in the same
strain as the earlier one, and it too was excluded from the mails;
and this time the exclusion was upheld by Judge A. N. Hand, who
sustained the Postmaster General on the ground that the MASSES
was not a "magazine or other publication regularly issued" within
the meaning of the postal laws, inasmuch as certain issues had
been justly excluded from the mails for a violation of the Espionage Act. 26 Th~s decision, therefore, asserted the justice of both
exclusions.
'
.. Quoted in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, Bulletin 7, p. 15. See also N. Y. Times,
22, 1917.
os C. R., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6852, Aug. 22, 1917•
.. In a letter to the Senate, Aug. 22, 1917, Mr. Burleson said: "In order for any
publication to ha\·e the second-class privilege, it must, among other things, be issued
regularly at stated intervals, and in order to be penJlitted to the mails under any. classifi·
cation it must be mailable under the law.
All the publications, including the Masses, which have had the second-hand privilege withdrawn on account of violations of the Espionage Act, have lost that classifica·
tion primarily for the reason that they were publishing matter which made their issues
non-mailable under any classification, and hence are not "newspapers and other periodl·
cal publications" within the meaning of the law governing second-class matter.
"For many years this department has held publications not to be 'regularly issued'

July
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At this point it may be well to note some of the objectionable utterances of the ¥Assts. The June issue contained the following
passage:
·
"We wish to persuade _those who love liberty and democracy enough to give their lives for it to withhold the gift
from this war and save it to use in the sad renewal of the
real struggle for liberty that will come after it,"-a very
direct .appeal against enlistment.
Again, the July issue said:
"We brand the declaration of war by our ·Government as
a crime against the people of the United States and against
-the nations of the world." Similarly, the August issue was fiUed with glorification of those
who refused to enlist and violated the law, and the September
issue contained like matter in diluted form.:2 7
On November 2, I9I7, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained
Judge Hough's stay of injunction. Thereupon the news-stands bein contemplation of law when any issue contained non-iµailable matter; and when the
second-class privilege has been withdrawn under such circumstances, the formal notice
of withdrawal has contained the statement that the second-class privilege has been revoked on the grouµds stated • • *
. "In the case of the Masses the final action was necessarily based on other and
much broader grounds than a break in the continuity of publication." C. R., 65th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6852, Aug. 22, 1917.
,.,. Bulletin 26, pp. 3·4- The case of the I eflers1Jnian. was similar to that of the
Mass,s. In the issu~ of Jj!ne. 1917, we find: "Men conscripted to go to Europe are virtual·
ly condemned to death and everybody knows it." A more direct appeal to obstruct recruiting appeared in July': "I advise the conscripts to await the decision of the United
Stales Supreme Court and not to be clubbed by the fact of conscription into enlistment."
Judge Speer, taking the same ground that Judge Hough had taken in the Masses case,
declared that the Postmaster General was right in excluding the Jeffersonian from the
mails. Bulletin 24.
But the Espion~.ge Act applies not only to comments on American affairs but to
those in regard to our allies. For example the Gaelic American was excluded from the
mails fol" printing the following in regard to the British Attorney General, Sir Frederick
Smith:· "Smith is in this country as the agent of the English Government, for the
purpose of perfecting cooperation betwee,; the United States and England in the war.
Yet he has no hesitation in making a bitter and brutal attack on the Irish People * * *
The clear-headed, keen-witted Yankees who read his bitter attack on the Irish will not
wonder at the Irish for refusing to fight for a government of which Smith is a member."
The Irish World was equally bitter against our allies and was excluded from the
mails for saying: "In fpite of political changes in any direction, the trend of French
"life and ideals for a century has been toward materialism. After every war and every
·misfortune their Government, political science, civic ideals, and other artistic productions
lia~e gone lower in the scale from the Catholic ideal."
Again of Palestine, it said: "Nothing of the sort [the establishment of a Jewish
Kingdom] is either promised or probable. Unless the Peace Congress should oblige them
to give up Paleshne, the country will be put on the same footing as Egypt. It will con·
t!nue under alien rule." ·
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gan refusing to receive copies of the MASSES, fearing prosecution
under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which had just been enacted.
Presently the MASSES staff were indicted on the two-fold charge of
attempting to send non-mailable matter through the mails, and of
conspiracy to violate· the Espionage Act, but the two trials which
followed both resulted in hung juries.
The MASSES had meantime ceased to exist, but the same editorial
'staff now publishes the °LIBERA'l'OR, which has thus far avoided trouble with the postal authorities.
The MASSES Case squarely raised three Constitutional issues:
( l) Is circulation in the mails a part of the freedom of the press?
(2).Have the courts the power to review the Postmaster General's
decisions as to non-mailability, or is the decision of· the ~ostmaster
General final? (3) Does the exclusion from the mails deprive a
publisher of property without due process of law? Let us consider
these points in turn.
( l) The contention that the denial of postal facilities is tantamount to a denial of the right of publication was first voiced by
Calhoun many years ago. But tlie Court has subsequently been at
pains to point out that the argument was not well founded.
In Ex parle Jackson, 96 U. S. 733, the Suprem~ Court, in denying that a law excluding lottery tickets from the mails abridged
the freedom of the press, said: "In excluding v~rious articles from
the mails the object of Congress has not ibeen to interfere with the
freedom of the press, or with any other rights of the people, but to
refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious
to the public morals." Also, in 'Upholding the act of 189<> by which
"any newspaper, circular, pamphlet or publication of any kitid containing any advertisement of any lottery" was excluded from the
mails, the Court remarked: "The circulation of newspapers is not
prohibited, but ~he Government declines itself to become an agent
in the circulation of printed matter which ·it regards as injurious
to the people. The freedom of communication is not abridged
wlthin the illtent and meaning of the provision unless Congress is
absolutely destitute of any discretion as to what shall or shall not
be carried in the mails, and compelled arbitrarily to assist in the
dissemination of matter condemned by its judgµient through the
governmental agencies which it controls.'128
Finally in Public Clearing Hott.rev. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904)
the Court said: "In establishing such [postal] system Congress may
restrict its use to letters and deny it to periodicals; it may admit
,. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. uo (1892). For the law, see 26 Stat. L., 463.
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books to the mails and refuse to admit merchandise, or it may
include all these and fail to embrace within its regulations telegrams
or large parcels of merchandise."
In short, the use of the mails, is, to an extent at least, a revocable
privilege, and may be subjected to reasonable conditions.29 We may
therefore agree with Judge Rogers in saying: "The Espionage Act
imposes no restraint prior to publications, and no restraint afterwards except as it restricts circulation through the mails. Liberty of
circulating may be essential to the freedom of the press, but liberty
of cir~ulating through the mails is not, so long as its transportation
in any other way as merchandise is not forbidden.. . . The Espionage Act, in so far as it excludes [from the mails] certain matter
declared to be non-mailable, is constitutional." (246 Fed. 29.)
(2) Likewise, there can be no doubt that the decisions of the
Postmaster General regarding the mailability of matter controlled
by the Act are final. Some of the precedents governing this phase
of the question are the following:
In United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 140 [r888],
the Court held that a mandamus. to the Commissioner of Pensions
was properly refused, saying: "The Court will not interfere by mandamus with the executive officers of the Government in the exercise
of their ordinary official duties, even when those duties require an
interpretatiqn of the law, the court having no appellate power for
that purpose." Again in Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S·
316, it was held that neither an injunction nqr a mandamus would
lie against an officer of the Land Department to control him in
!llscharging an official duty which required the exercise of his
judgment and discretion. Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the
Court, said: "Whether he [the Secretary of the Interior] decided
right or wrong is not the question. Having jurisdiction to decide
at all, he had necessarily jurisdiction and it was his duty to decide
as he th9ught the law was, and the courts have no power whatever
under those circumstances to review his determination by mandamus or injunction."
Still more to the point, if possibie, is the language of Justice
Brown in Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. ro6 (1904).
"Where Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his
20 In 1907; for example, Attorney General Bonaparte advised Mr. Roosevelt "that
it is clearly and fully within the power of Congress to exclude from the mails publications
such as La Questione Sociale and to make the use or attempted use of the mails for the
transmission of such writing a crime against the United States. Rogers, Postal Powers
of Congress, p. l 19.
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action thereon, whether it involve questions of law or fact, will not
be reviewed by the courts, unless he has exceeded his authority or
this court should be of the opinion that his action was clearly
wrong."30
From these cases Judge Rogers concluded: "This court holds,
therefore, that if the Postmaster General has been authorized and
directed by Congress not to transmit certain matter by mail and is
to determine whether a particular publication is non-mailable under
the law, he is required to use judgment and discretion in so determining, and his decision must be regarded as conclusive by the courts,
unless it appears that it was clearly wrong.31
The entire question, then, resolved itself into a determination
whether the Postmaster General acted within his jurisdiction under
the authority conferred upon him by Congress. His constitutional
right to use discretion within that jurisdiction is clearly established.
(3) Lastly, did the denial of postal facilities deprive the owners
of the MAss:Es of property without due process of law? The argument that it did seems to rest on the assumption that due process
of law always signifies judicial process, which is far from the case.
In the words of Judge Cooley (Weimer v. Brubury, 30 Mich. 201),
"there is nothing in these words ['due process of law'] which
necessarily implies that due process of law must be judicial process."32 Indeed the statute which confers powers upon the Postmaster General to prevent the mails from being used as an instrument of fraud seems to stand on all fours with the present law, and
it received the sanction of the Court in the following words: "It
is too late to argue that due process of law is denied whenever the
disposition of property is affect~d by the order of an executive department. Many, if not most, of the matters presented to these
departments require for their proper solution the judgment or discretion of the head of the department, and in many cases, notably
those connected"·with the disposition of the .public lands, the action
""Sec also Dec.Uur v. Paulding, 14 Peters 497: Public Clearing Houu v. Coyne,
v. Hitchee>ck, 226 U. S.; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S.
HMasses Publisliing Company v. Patten, Bulletin 7, p. 10 and 246 Fed. 33. As
Judge Hongh said: "It is at least arguable whether any constitutional government can
be judicially compelled to assist in the dissemination of something that proclaims itself
rcvolutionary,-which exists not to reform but to destroy the rule of any party, clique
or faction that could give even lip service to the Constitution of the United States."
New York Times, Aug. 2, 1917.
In the Masses case and the Jeffersonian case his action was upheld. To show the
Postmaster General is wrong, Judge Speer (Jeffersonian Pub. Co. v. West, B. 24) said
the petitioner "must come before the court with clean bands."
02 See also Murray v. Hoboken Land and Imp. Co., 18 Hon. 272 and Bushnell v.
Leland, 164 U. S.
194 U. S.: Smith
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of the department is accepted as final by the courts, and even when
involving questions of law this action is attended by a strong pre·
sumption of its correctness."33
Two Constitutional objections were raised in· Congress to Title
XII which did not come before the courts: (I) That Title XII
denied the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures; ( 2) that a practical censorship
would be created, since publishers would have to consult the Post·
master General before publishing any questionable matter. The
former objection was removed by amendment,84 and the latter clearly
fails to distinguish betwee~ a censorship imposed upon the press by
law and "a voluntary censorship" so-called, instituted for the conA
venience of publishers to guide them in their interpretation of their
-legal duties and to warn them _fro~ possibly dangerous courses.
III.
Excr,usroN FROM !N'l'ERSTA'l'E _COMMERCE.

Title XII may be said to have been completed by Section 19 of
the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, which reads
in part as follows :
·
"That ten days after the approval of this Act, and until
the end of the war, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm,
corporation, or association~ to print, publish, or circulate or
33 Public Clearing Hwse v. Coyne, 19+ U. S. 497 (1904).
See also Bates at1Cl Guild
Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106; American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty;

187

u. s.

Further in answering the objection that due process of law was denied when an
executive official was given authority to control the disposition of property the Court
in the Coyue case said: "Nor do we think the law unconstitutional because the Post·
master General may seize and detain all letters, which may include letters of a purely
personal or domestic character and having no connection whatever with the prohibited
enterPrise." In view of the fact that by these sections the postmaster is denied permis·
sion to open any letters not addressed to himself, there would seem to be no possible
method of enforcing the law except by authorizing him to seize and detain all such let·
ters. It is true it may occasionally happen that he would detain a letter having no
relation to the prohibited business; but where a person is engaged in an enterprise of
this kind, receiving dozens and peihaps hundreds of letters every day, containing remittances or correspondence connected with the prohibited business, it is not too much
to assume that prima facie at least, all such letters are identified with such business. A
ruling that ·only" such letters as were obviously connected with the enterPrise could be
detained would amount to a practical annulment of the law, as it would be quite im·
possible, without opening and inspecting such letters, which is forbidden, to obtain cvi·
deuce of the real facts." Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904). See also
Powell v. PenffSYlvania,- 127 U. S. 678, 685; 32 L. ed. 253, 256, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992,
1257; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133. 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499.
36 The amendment read as follows:
"Nothing in this section shall be so construed
as to authorize any person other than an employee of the dead-letter effice duly author·
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cause to be printed, published or circulated in any foreign,
language, any news item, editorial or other printed matter,
respecting the Government of the United States, or of any
nation engaged in the present war, its policies, international
relations, the state or conduct of the war, or any matter
relating thereto : Provided, that this section shall not apply
to any print, newspaper or publication, where the publisher,
or distributor thereof, on or before offering the same for
mailing or in any manner distributing it to the public, has
fil{!d with the postmaster at the place of publication, in the
form of an affidavit, a true and complete translation of the
entire article containing such matter proposed to be printed,
in plain type in the English language, at the head of such
print, newspaper, or publication, the words 'True translation
filed with the postmaster at . • . . • • on . . • • . • as required oy
the Act of •.... . !
"Any print, newspaper or publication in any foreign language which does not con.form to this section is hereby_ declared to be non-mailable, and it shall be unlawful for any ·
person, firm, corporation, or association to transport, carry
or other·wise pieblish or distribute any matter which is made
non-mailable by the pro'lli.sions of the act relat·ing to espionage, approved lime 15, 1917 = Provided further, that upon
evidence satisfactory to him that any print, newspaper or
publication printed in a foreign language may be printed,
published and distributed free from the foregoing restrictions
and conditions without detriment to the United States in the
present war, the President may cause to be issued to the
printers or publishers of such print, newspaper or publication, a permit to print, publish and circulate the issue or issues
of their newspaper· or publication free from such restrictions
and requirements, such permits to be subject to revocation
at his discretion. And the Postmaster General shall cause
cop_ies of all such permits to be furnished to the postmaster
of the postoffice serving the place from which the print,
newspaper or publication granted the permit is to emanate.
"l\.ny person who shall make an affidavit containing any
ized thereto, to open any letter not addressed to himself."

C. R, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.,

p. :n62.

For similar language see 25 Stat. L., 873.
The seizure of letters in any other way is unlawful: 35 Stat. L., n25.
The amendment was added to prevent abuse of power by tbe Postmaster General,
C. R., May 4, 1917.
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false statement· in connection with the translation provided
for in this sectio.n shall be guilty of tbe crime of perjury
·and subject to the punishment provided therefor by section
one. hundred and twenty-five of the act of March 4th, 190C).
entitled 'an Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws
of the United States,' and any person, firm, corporation or
association violating .any other requirement of this section
shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more
than $500, or by imprisonment for not more than one year,
or in the discretion of the court, may be both fined and imprisoned."85
The Constitutional question raised by these provisions is clear
from our consideration of the. MASSES Case. In that case the court
in sustaining Title XII had been at pains to point out that "the act
of Congress now Ca.Ued in question does not undertake to say that
certain matters shall not be transmitted in interstate commerce."
But this is just what the Trading with the Enemy Act does undertake to say; the question is, therefore, whether Congress has the
'right to deny published matter the facilities of interstate commerce.
The theory of the Court in the Jackson Case cited above is clearly
adverse to any such claim of authority. In that case the Court said:
"L1·berty of circulating is as essential to that freedom [of the press]
as liberty of publishing; irideed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value; if, therefore, printed matter be excluded from the mails, its transportation in any other way cannot
be forbidden by Congress."
. And in the Rapier Case the language used is of like import even
though less outspoken.86 Furthermore, even in Chwmpion v. Ames,
while sustaining the right of Congress to exclude lottery tickets from
interstate commerce, the Court did so on the theory that such tickets
were "articles of commerce,'' and it avoided the question also raised
in that case of Congress's right to exclude lottery advertisements
from interst~te commerce.87
Altogether, therefore, 1 think it has to be admitted that the
Supreme Court•s position on the question of the exclusion of published matter from the channels of interstate commerce is still somewhat doubtful. Nevertheless, the position that the Court must
finally take is clear enough. Surely there can be no right of circulation in interstate commerce for matter which may be directly
.. Trading with the Enemy Act, Stat., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 425-426. Italics are mine•
.. 143' U. S., IIO (1892) •
.,. 188

u. s.

321 (1902).
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banned by law. Conceding that Congress had the right to penalize
the kind of publications which it does penalize by the Espionage
Act, it had the collateral right to exclude such publications not only
from the mails but also from interstate commerce. There can be
no right of circulation for that which there is no right to utter.88
There is little question of the constitutionality of that section of
the Trading with the Enemy Act which requires a translation of
articles written in a foreign language. The primary purpose of the
section was to make the Espionage Act more easily enforceable.
The Court, following its usual custom of making large allowances
for the requirements of administration,39 would probably uphold
the section. Moreover, it could scarcely be said that any restraint
is put upon the freedom of the press, since the provision, taken by
itself, in no wise re~tricts the expression of opinion, but merely
imposes conditions, compliance with which is necessary before
papers are allowed to circulate in interstate commerce.~
Title XII, has received its most recent extension from the Act of
May 16, 1918, which, however, is principally important for its additions to Title I, Section 3 of the Act, which is considered below.
The provisions of the later act affecting Title XII are the following:
"That Section l of Title XII and all other provisions of
the Act entitled 'An Act to prevent interference with the
foreign COmplerce, etc., of the United States' which apply
to Section 3 of Title I thereof shall apply with equal force
and effect to said Section 3 as amended.
"Section 3. That. Title XII of the said Act of June 15,
1917, be, and the same is, hereby amended by adding· thereto
the following Section-(4):
"The Postmaster General may, upon evidence satisfactory
to him that any person or concern is using the mails in
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, instruct the
Postmaster at any postoffice at which the mail is received
addressed to such person or concern to return to the postmaster at the office at which they were originally mailed all
letters or other matter so addressed, with the words 'Mail
"For intimation that Congress m:iy regulate interstate commerce, even though its
laws are in the nature of police regulations sec Hoke and Economides v. U.S., :z27 U. S.;
Hommer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
"See Crone v. Campbell, :z45 U. S.; Otis v. Porker, 187 U. S.; Miller v. Oregon,
:zo8 U. S.; Sil:: v. Hcslerberg, :zn U. S.; McDermott v. Wis., :z:zS U. S.
••In Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan (:z:z9 U. S.) the Court upheld the Newspaper Pub·
licity Law (37 Stat. L. 553), which imposed restrictions upon the press.
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to this address undeliverable under the Espionage Act' plainly
written or stamped upon the outside thereof, and all such
letters or other matter so returned to such postmasters shall
be by them returned to the· senders thereof under such regulations as the Postmaster General may describe."41
'
. The chief question here raised is as to the scope and intention of
the new provision. Is it preventive and protective merely, .or is it
punitive?. If the intention of Congress is to penalize the violation
of the Espionage Act 'by this measure, Section 4 is clearly uncon~,titutional as amounting to a denial of trial by jury. But the adoption of such a provision to'prevent further violations of the law
and to aid in its enforcement presents merely the question just considered in connection with the requirements of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, that certain matter published in a foreign language
be accompanied by a translation in English. It may be added that
the Fraud Order Act of 1913, the validity of which is, as we have
seen, fully established, employs language which is almost identical
with that of the section under consideration.
From this discussion it is clea:r that the use of the mails is, to
some extent, a revocable privilege, subject to regulation by Congress.
By authorization of Congress, the Postmaster General may exercise
large discretion in determining what shall be transmitted through
the mails : provided always that he acts within the jurisdiction
conferred upon him. Congressional authority is also validly exercised in excluding certain matter from interstate commerce. Exclusion of matter from the mails and from interstate commerce alike
is clearly within the power of Congress, if such action is necessary
to make effective legitimate re~trictions tlpon the freedom of publication.
IV.
DISLOYAi, Ut't£RANCES.

So far we have dealt with those provisions of the Espionage Act
which are intended primarily to govern the circulation of matter,
and we have stated the general conclusion that the right of circulation is collateral to the right of publication, and that, accordingly,
there can be 110 right of circulation where there is no right of publication or utterance. We now turn to Section 3 of Title I of the
same Act, which is designed directly to curb certain kinds of utterances. It reads as _follows:
u Public No. 150, 65th Cong. (H. R. 8753).
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"Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false statements with intent to interfere with the operations or success of the United States or
to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the
United States is at' war, shall willfully cause or attempt to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty
in the military or naval forces of the United State_s, or shall
willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the
United States, to the injury of the service of the United
States, shall be punished 1by a fine of not more than $10,000
or imprisonment for not more than 20 years or both."42
Though these provisions, as I have indicated, touch immediately
the matter of freedom of utterance under the Constitution, they
called forth; curiously enough, very little discussion on the floors of
Congress. They have, on the other hand, come under judicial
scrutiny in a great number of cases, to which, therefore, we may
tum for further light upon the constitutional question. For not only
have the courts uniformly upheld this section, but they have construed its terms liberally from the point of view of authority
rather than otherwise; and they have done this, it must be presumed,
with the elementary rule in mind, that it is the duty of the courts
to construe statutes, if possible, so as to keep them within Constitutional limitations. Our review of ·the cases may- well begin_
with some general considerations underlying them all.43
The defendant in a criminal action, we are more than once reminded in these cases, is presumed to be innocent until his guilt
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the fact that an indictment has been brought against him is no evidence of his guilt.44
To the benefit of this presumption each defendant is entitled unless,
or until, it have been removed by evidence proving his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The burden is, therefore, on the Government
of establishing every essential element of the crime charged beyond
a reasonable doubt, which "is a doubt growing reasonably out of the
evidence or lack of it." It is, in other words, "not a captious doubt;
"Stat., 65th Cong., 1st Sess., :.118.
"The renew of these cases is based upon the Department of Justice Bulletins (here,after referred to as "B"). It has been charged that the Department of Justice has
attempted to infiuence judicial decisions by suppressing those which were contrary to the
Attorney General's interpretation of the law. A few such cases are cited in Nelles,
Es/iionage Act Cases, but the evidence does not seem conclusive.
"U. S. v. Harper, B. 76, p. ,-; U. S. v. Gneiser et cJ., B. 71, p. 2; U. S. v. Wolf,
B. 81, p. 3; U. SI. v. H. G. Mackley, B. 83, p. 1; U. S. v, Schenk et al., B. 43; U, S, v.
Pierce, B. 52; U. S. v. Baltzer, B. 3.
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not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the- unfortunate
position of the defendant or the dislike to accept the responsibility
of convicting a fellow man." If accordingly, having weighed the
evidence on both sides, one reaches the conclusion that a defendant
is guilty to that degree of certainty that would lead one on to act
on the faith of it in. the most iniportant and critical affairs of one's
life, one may properly vote for conviction. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not
proof beyond the possibility of a mistake. If such were the standard of evidence required, most criminals would go unwhipped of
justice.45
~ · The jury, in considering the evidence, is, of course, to maintain
an impartial and unbiased judgment.°'6 Judge Day charged the jury:
"To no extent are you to be influenced by any bias on the one hand
or prejudice on the other hand that may arise from extraneous
considerations or from your sympathies for or against the defendant personally or for or against the United States in its efforts to
enforce the criminal laws."u Such instructions were generally
given in the Espionage cases.
A material element of the criines punished by Section 3 is the
intent with which the acts there enumerated are per£ormed. What
is intent? "Intent," says the court in one of these cases, "in doing
an act, speaking words, or writing them, . . . is made up, among
other things, of what a person thinks and desires and wishes to
accomplish or to bring about by means of the· doing of the act,
or the speaking of the words, or the writing'' (of them) .48 In short,
intent means "the conscious expectation of the effect to be produceci.""0
But naturally, it is impossible to enter into the mind of man and
determine by any sort of scientific demonstration what he expects
to accomplish. So at this point the law steps in and says that a man
.. U. S. v. Ycutrey, 91 F~d. 868;
" Some of the criticism directed against the enforcement of the act is due to the
fact that the jurors' minds have been inflamed by appeals to patriotism and by constant
reminders from the U. S. attorneys that the Act must be strictly enforced.
See in this connection Annual Report of the Attorney General (1918), p. 673No. 82+
41 U. S. v. Gneiser, B. 71, p. r.
See also U. S. v. Balti:er et al., B· 3, p. lo; U. S. v. Mar Easftr.an, ·"Espionage Act
Cases", p. 29.
It may be remarked that Mr. Nelles' book, "Espionage Act Cases", was produced
with the evident purpose of influencing opinion in favor of a milder interpretation of
the law. With this purpose in view, only certain sections of the cases reported in the
Bulletins are given, and cases not elsewhere reported are treated at length.
'" U. S. v. Clinton H. Pierce, B. 52, p. 18.
"'See U. S. v. Floyd Ramp, B. 66; U. S. v. Huhn, B. 58.
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is presumed to intend the reasonable and natural consequences of
his acts, and that a man can not say or do a thing that will have
certain consequences and then say he did not intend them. As
various judges have put it: If the natural consequences of a defendant's language is calculated to produce the effect of causing disloyalty
-then there may be indulged a ptesumption that that was his ntention. But that is not a conclusive presumption.50 This pre'sumption is one of fact, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
and it may •be said to apply to one's words as well as to one's acts.51
Questions of fact under the Espionage Act are, of course, .determined by the jury. It is evident, therefore, that the jury must
decide whether the natural, reasonable and proba:ble effect of a
statement would be the unlawful things forbidden by the act, which
in turn is a question to be resolved in light of all the circumstances
of the case.62 In this connection the words of Judge Amidon in his
charge to the jury in the Brinton Case, are pertinent:
''You can tell what was in Mr. Brinton's mind . . . by
weighing his speech, his language, the occasion upon which
it was spoken, and then say, under your oaths, as an infer~
ence ·from it, whether he was actuated -by that purpose or
not." 58
The point may also be illustrated concretely. Thus Mrs. Stokes
was convicted for saying in public print: "No government which
is for profiteers can· also be for the people, and I am for the people,
while the government is for the profiteers."5 '
On the other hand,
J ttdge Hook in granting a new trial to one Charles Doll said:
"The crimes were charged to have been committed June
1917, by the use of language which was too profane
and obscene to be set forth in this opinion. It was quite
clearly shown at the trial that the accus~d was under the
influence of liquor and had or thought he had a grievance
against the government over a right to timber from a forest
20,

'"Sec U. S. v. William Denson, B. 142; U. S. v. Windmuller, B. 112; U. S.
v. Stet•ens, B. 116; U. S. v. Goldsmith, B. 133; U. S. v. Wallace, B. 4; U. S. v,
O'Hare, B. 49; U. S. v. Williams, B. 118; U. S. v. Pierce, B. 52; U. s, v, U-'aldron,
B. 79; U. S. v. Mackley, B. 83.
""See U. S. v. Fontana, B. 148; U. S. v. Prieth, B. 156; U. S. v. Shoeber, B, 149, p, 3.
12 U.S. v. Weinberg, B. 123; U.S. v. Bussel, B. 131.
03 U.S. v. Briton, B. 132, p. 8. See also: U.S. v. Spillner, B. 145; U. s:v, Martin,
B, 15,.; U. S. v. Henrickson, B. 86; U. S. v. Frerichs, B. 85; U. S. v. Pundt, B. 82;
U. S. v. Fosler, B. 8,.; U. S. v. Sugarman, B. 12.
" U. S. v. Stokes, B. 1~6, p. 2.
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reservation. The language was used in a conversation with
two forest officers to whom he made his complaints. It appeared that at the time the officers were also engaged in
recruiting for the Engineer Military service, but the fact
was not told the accused nor did he know it • . • We think
there was nothing in this ca,se fairly indicating that the
accused intended the results which are the essential elements
of the offenses or that such results in fact followed or would
naturally follow what he said."55
It will be seen that the expressions of Doll were much stronger
than those of Mrs. Stok~s, but the circumstances proved that tlie
intent of the latter was penal, while that of the former was not.
We may' now turn more particularly to the section under discussion. It is needless to say that after April 6, 1917, the United
States was at war with Germany. We may, then, confine our attention to the criminal acts covered by the section and to a definition
of its terms.
It is clear that three classes of ·acts constitute crimes under these
provisions. The first consists in the willful making or conveying
false reports or statements with the intent specified. The second
is the willful causing or attempting to cause in.subordination, mutiny,
or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United
States. The third consists in willfully obstructing the recruiting
or enlistment service of the United States. Let us consider these
crimes seriatim.
The first crime is willfully making or conveying false statements,
etc., with the intent to interfere with the operation or success of the
military or naval forces of the United States. The. falsity of the
statement being shown, the intent is the essential element of the
crime. As I have shown, the intent is determined from the character of the utterance and the circumstances under which it was
made.511 ''Willfully" is defined to mean willingly, purposely, inteptionally, as contradistinguished from accidentally or inadvertently: it emphasizes the notion of intent. 57
Since the making of false reports or statements with the specified
intent is made illegal, it is important to know what the courts class
as false statements. It is generally conceded that
" U. S. v. Charles Doll, B. 163, pp. 1·2.
11

st

Supra, note 52.
U. S. v. Waldron, B. 79, p. 5; U. S. v. Pierce, l!. 52, p. 17.
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"A false report or statement, as used here, means a statement as to some past or existing fact. It would not ~nclude
a mere opinion, a prophecy or a wish, or a hope, because
those are not statements of fact." 38
But the line between these two categories is not always clear.
Judge Munger thought Claude Bunyard could not be held guilty
'Under this clause for saying: "This is a rich man's war, and a poor
man's battle"; but some other judges would probably have taken a
more rigorous view.39 The sanie difficulty is further illustrated by
the cases which concerned statements about the motive of our ,
entrance into the war. Opinions might vary about that. Nevertheless, some judges have ruled that there is a definite criterion of
truth in the matter. Thus Judge Jack in a charge to the jury states:
''You will note that Congress assigned for its reason for
the adoption of the resolution (of war) that the Imperial
German Government had committed repeated acts of war
against the Government and people of the United States of
America. Congress but recited historical facts well known
to all who read the newspapers and keep up with current
events.
"It is not for you to question the correction of this finding
and declaration of Congress, but you should accept it as
correctly stating the cause for the entrance of the United
States into the war." 60
It is perhaps safe to state that one can not affirm without considerable risk that we went into the war from unworthy motives.
One other question which arises in connection with the crime of
making false statements is, Who compose the "military and naval
forces of the United States"? In this particular connection, the.
phrase has been very broadly construed, much more broadly than
in connection with the two ensuing clauses of the section. Thus
Judge 'Wooley says:
"The controlling word of the statute is interference, and
if the intent with which the false statements are made is to
work such interference, it matters little whether-that end is
11 U. S. v. Frerichs, B. S.5, p. 6. See also: U. S. v. Hall, ::48 Fell. 156; Masses Pub.
Co. v. Patten, Nelles, Espionage Cases, p. ;n; U. S. v. Zimmerman, Nelles, p. 10.
• U. S. v. Bunyard, B. 168, p. :r.
eo U. S. v. Harper, B. 76, p. 3, The same is implied in U. S. v. Pierce, B. 52;
U, S. v. Stokes, B. 106.
a U. S. v. Stevens, B. n6, p. 7. See also U. S. v. Koenig, B. 123.
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reached directly or indirectly. In other words, so far as the
first crime is concerned, to interfere with the success of the
country by destroying, or weakening, or undermining any
recognized and properly adapted instrumentality or organization which effectively aids in and contributes to that success
is' to interfere with the success of the military forces within
the meaning of this statute." 61
Subs~antially the ~ame opinion is expressed or implied in nearly
every judicial utterance dealing with the crime of making false statements with the specified intent.
To conclude, therefore--The first offense punished by Section 3
of Title I of° the Espionage Act consists in purposely making false
statements of fact with the design, as shown by the circumstances,
of interfering directly or indirectly with any organized and recognized agency of the Government that is engaged in pushing the war
to .a successful conclusion.
The second· offense, in the language of the statute, consists in
'willfully causing or attempting to cause insubordination, mutiny or
refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States.'
It will not be necessary to repeat the definitions I have given, except
that of "the military and naval forces of the United States."
One view has it that the military and naval forces include those
who have been examined, accepted and enrolled as soldiers.62 This
is the narrowest meaning that has been given .the term and but few
judges have so interpreted the statute.
The preponderant opinion is that the "military forces" as the
term is used in this part of the section, include those who have
registered and who have received their serial numbers. Judge
Westenhaver, in defining the term, says:

"For the purpose of this act and this offense, I say to
you that all such persons thus registered and enrolled and
thus subject from time to time to be called intq active service are a part of the military forces of the United States."68
02 U. S. v. Britton, B. 132; U. S. v. Mayer, B. 156; U. S. v Frerichs, B. 85;
U. S. v. Fontana, B. 148; U. S. v. Hall, 248 Fed. 150.
a U. S. v. Debs, B. 155, p. 6. See also: 30 Stat., 361; U.· S. v. S-ugannan, B. 12;
U. S. v. Reeder, B. 161; U. S. v. Harper, B. 76; U. S. v. Waldron, B. 79; U, S. v.
Rhuberg, B. 94; U. S. v. :Miller, B. 104; U. S. v. Stokes, B. 106; U. S. v. Sandvick,
B. u3; U. S. v. Graham, B. r20. In U. S. v. Fontana, B. 148, the court intimates that
the registrants must have been accepted before they can be said to be in the military
f~rces. In the majority of cases, however an attempt to arouse physical resistance to the
draft would be within this clause.
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Under other judges a yet wider application has been given the
term. Judge Hamilton declares: "The military forces of the
United States means all the able bodied men of the United States," 6 i
a view which still other judges have curtailed somewhat by confining it to men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. 6u
But by what methods, in what way, may one cause or attempt
to cause insubordination, etc.? Not merely by acts, in the conventional sense of the term, but by words as well, written or spoken,
answer the courts.66 Nor is the truth or falsity of a statement
material to the offenses recognized by this and the ensuing clause
of the section; their tendency and intent are their important ingredients.

"If," says Judge Amidon of certain defendants, "they disseminated printed matter which, though it might be historically true, still, as a natural result, would tend to accomplish
things forbidden by law, and the act was done with willful
intent to accomplish those results, it would be a crime."61
In brief, then, any utterance tending to incite insubordination,
etc., on the part of men registered and enrolled in the service of the
United States, would offend against the second clause of Section 3,
unless the circumstances surrounding the utterance clearly established the lack of criminal intent.
The third crime covered by Section 3 is the willful obstruction of
the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service of the United States. Any obstruction of the
recruiting would be to the injury of the service, so we may omit
consideration of that point. We have to consider, then, the meaning
of the phrase, "obstruction" of the "recruiting and enlistment service."
The word "obstruct" is defined to mean to hinder, to embarrass,
to make progrep;s more difficult or slow, and in its broadest use
means active opposition to the recruiting and enlistment service of
the United States by advising or counseling others not to enlist.08
In other words, no act of violence is required to complete the offense; it may be consummated by mere words spoken or written. 69
U. S. v. Capo, B. 37, p. 5.
U. S. v. Kirschner, B. 69; U. S. v. Hicks, B. 160; U. S. v. Herman, B. 109•
es U. S. v. Wallace, B. 4, p. S·
OT U. S. v. Wishek, B. 153, p. 5. See also: U. S. v. O'Hare, B. 49; U. S. v, Prieth,
B. 156; U. S. v. Film Ct>., B. 33.
es U. S. v. Waldron, B. 79, p. 7•
.. U. S. v. Wi11dmuller, B. 1u; O'Hare v. U, S., B. 165; U. S. v. Freiricks, B, 85;
U. S. v. Stokes, B 106.
As Justice Holmes, in· Debs v. U. S., says: "" " " If a part or the manifest foten·
61
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What is the "recruiting and enlistment service" ? In the first
pJace it is composed of "all instrumentalities and officers in charge
thereof." 70 But it extends, further, to voluntary enlistment. Thus,
Judge Munger states, it may be an obstruction of the enlistment
service if "statements are made to those who may enlist, the natural
and reasonable· effe.cts of which would be, if believed, to discourage,
delay, or hinder, even if it did not finally prevent those persons
from eitlis?ng in the :Army or Navy." 71 And, of course, interference with the operation of the draft laws is obstruction of the recruiting service, wherefore the courts have generally held that to
persuade young men not to answer draft notices is an obstruction
of recruiting. This position has recently been sustained by the
Supreme Court.72
.·We may sum up the third crime, then, by saying that the courts
. have held it illegal intentionally to check, retard or make slow, by
word or deed, either the draft or voluntary enlistment,78 or to
interfere with the officers and agencies of either.
·Section 3 of Title I of the original Espionage Act was greatly extended by an amendment which. became law on May 16th, 1918.
The amende4 section reads as follows,. the newer portions of the section being included in brackets :
"Whoever, when the United •States is at war, shall willfully
make or convey false reports or statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval
forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its
~nemies, [or shall. willfully or convey false reports or false
statements-, or say or do anything, ex~ept by way of bona
fide and not disloyal advice to an investor or investors, with
intent to obstruct the sale by the United States of bonds or
tion of the more general utterances was to encourage those present to obstruct the recruiting service, and if in pa'ssages such encouragement was directly given, the immunity
of the general theme may not be enough to protect the speech." Quoted U. S. v.
Nearing, B. 198, p. 7.
"' U. S. v. Stokes, B. 106, p. II.
n U. S. v. Frerichs, B. 85, p. 9. See also U. S. v. Elmer, B. 171. That one may
be convicted of conspiracy to obstruct recruiting by words of persuasion is plainly stated
in Schenk v. U. S., B. 194, p • .;.
"'Schenk v. U. S., B. 194' p. 4. See also: U. S. V\ Capo, B. 3?; U. S. v, Taubert,
B. 108; U. S. v. Wolf, B. 81; U. S. v. Rhuberg, B. 107; U. S. v, Hitt, B. 53. Als<>
indieated in U. S. v. Schenk, B. 43; U- S. v. Doe, B. 55. It is argued that an intcrfer·
ence with the draft is not punishable under this clause, because clause :z, section :z, deals
with the same subject. This is not a ulid argument because obstruction of the draft is
not the only subject covered by this clause. U. S. v. Prieth, B. 130, p. 7•
.. U. S. v. Frerichs, B. 85; U. S. v. Henricksen, B. 86; U. S. v. Pierce, 245
Fed. 878.
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other securities of the United States or the making of loans
by or to the United States], and whoever, when the United
States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause
(or incite) insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of
duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or
shall willfully obstruct [or attempt to obstruct] the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States [and whoever,
'when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter,.
print, write or publish any disloyal, _profane, scurrilous or
abusive language about the form of government. of the United
States, or the military or naval forces of the United States,
or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the army
or navy of the United States or any language calculated to
bring the form of government of the United States, the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval
forces of the United States, or the uniform of the army
or navy of tjle United States, into contempt, scorn, contumely or disrepute, or shall willfully utter, print, write
or publish any language intended to incite, provoke or encourage resistance to the United States or to promote the
cause of its enemies or shall willfully display the flag of any
foreign enemy, or shall willfully by utterance, writing, printing, publication, or language spoken, urge, incite or advocate
any curtailment of production in this country of any thing
or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the
prosecution of the war in which the United States may be
engaged, with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder
the United States in the prosecution of the war, and whoever
shall willfully advocate, favor, teach, def end or suggest the
doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated,
and whoever sh!J.ll by word or act support or favor the cause
of any country With which the United States is at war, or by
word or act oppose the cause of the United State~ tP.erein;
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $ro,ooo or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both: Provided that
"Any employee or official of the United •States government
who commits any disloyal act or utters any unpatriotic or
disloyal language, or who, in an abusive and violent manner
criticizes the Army or Navy or the flag of the United States,
shall be dismissed from the service. Any such employee shall
be dismissed by the head of the department in which the em-
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ployee may be engaged, and any such official shall be dismissed by the authority having power to appoint a successor to
the dismissed official]. " 1~
While the measure was pending in the Senate, Mr. France of
Maryland sought to qualify its rigors with the following proviso :
"Provided, however, that nothing in this act shall be construed as limiting the liberty or impairing the right of any individual to publish or speak what is true with good motives
and for justifiable ends."76
The proviso passed the Senate, but at the request of the Attorney
.General was stricken out in conference.
"Experience teaches," urged the Attorney Gen~ral, "that
such an amendment would to a great degree nullify the value
of the law and tum every trial into an academic discussion
on insoluble riddles as to what is true. Human motives are
too complicated to be discu~sed,76 and the word justifiable is
too elastic for practical use." 77
It will be noted that the first crime covered by the amendment of
May, I9I8, is "maki~g false statements with the intent to obstruct
the sale of United States bonds," etc. There is some reason for
holding that the obstruction of the sale of bonds was covered by the
Public Document No. 150, 65th Congress (H. R. 8753).
The proviso amounts to a recommendation and need not be considered here. It was
aimed especially at George Creel, Chairman of the Committee on Public Information.
,.. C. R., 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6517, April 25, 1918.
The introduction of new words into the law covers defects in the old law (Louis"Uille a1'd Nash"Uille R. R. Co. v. Motley, 219 U. S.). Persons convicted under the law
of 1917 for crimes enumerated in the amendment of May, 1918, may appeal their cases,
on the grounn that such ·crimes were not contemplated by the law of June 15, 1917.
Whether the Supreme Court would grant new trials on this basis is doubtful in view of
the tttterance in ScMnk v. U. S., B. 194, p. +
••In showing that motive differed from intent, the words of Judge Howe, in U. S.
v. Waldron, B. 79, p. 6, were given as a correct statement of law: "You should be careful not to mix motives with intent. Motive is that which leads to an act; intent grati·
fies it. A crime may be committed with both a good and an evil motive. To illustrate:
The father of a large family steals bread for his starving children and also to deprive
the owner of its value. He has two moµves, one is good and one is evil, but he is
guilty, notwithstanding he has a good motive as well as an evil motive, for he must not
steal at all." See also: Warner v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 29 Fed. 387; Johnson v. U. S.,
r57 U. S. 325; Williamson v. U. S., 207 U. S. 425; People v. Molineau~, 61 E. E. 286.
tt C. R., 65th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6518, May 4, 1918. The letters are well worth
reading. They show (1) the necessity for such a law and (2) the influence of the Ad·
ministration over Congress.
14
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For example, Judge Wooley thus

"But if you find that the words constitute a false statement
of fact, as distinguished from mere opinion, and that their
natural and probable consequences, in being addressed to
·Mable P. Van Trump, were, if heeded, to prevent or deter
her by persuasion or alarm from pursuing her activity in
seeking subscriptions for liberty bonds, and thereby to obstruct their sale to that extent and thereby to interfere to that
extent with the Government in getting money with which to
operate the military forces, then I say to you, that you find
the prisoner intended such consequence, and that, the words
being false and willfully spoken with that intent, he has committed the offense forbidden ,by the statute and your verdict
should be 'guilty'." 78
,
However, a sufficient number of judges took the narrower view
to cause the Department of Justice to wish the insertion of this
clause in the latter act.
The words "or say or do anything, except by way of bona fide
and not disloyal advice to an investor or investors, with intent to
obstruct the sale by the United States of bonds or other securities
of the United States, or the making of loans by or to the United
States,'' give the substance of the crime. As always, intent is the
material element of the offense, an:d must be determined from the
circumstances in which something is said or done. The word
"obstruct" has essentially the meaning given above-to impede, or,
hinder, or delay, or embarrass. "Obstructfon," says Judge Munger, "would include mere delay as well as final refusal." 79
The second new element introduced into the bill is making the
attempt to obstruct the recruiting and enlistmept service a crime.
It had been widely held before the passage of the amendment that
the obstruction must 'be actual,80 however inconsiderable; that, in
other words, some real obstruction must ,be shown to have followed
the words or acts. It is true that some judges had taken a broader
view, holding that words spoken or acts done with intenf to obstruct
n U. S. v. Frank Stevens, B. 116, p. 6. See ante, discussion of "military forces."
" U. S. v Brackett, B. r70, p. 2. See also the discussion supra, of obstruction of
recruiting and Schenk v. U. S., B. r94, p. 4
80 U. S. v. Zimmerman, Nelles, Espionage Cases, p. r4; U. S. v. P11ndt, B. 82; U. S.
v. Orlando Hitt, B. 53; U. S. v. Ves. Hall, 248 Fed. r50.
Other references are given in connection with the third crime of the original Title
I, Sec. 3, supra.
·
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were punishable, but there were enough who took the narrower
view to cause the Attorney General to recommend ·that the ambiguifi be _s:leared up. As the law now stands, the degree of success of an attempt is not important.81
But some courts had held that the appeal to ·resist the law must
be "direct." Thus, Judge Learned Hand, in Masses Pub. Co. v. Pat- ten, says:
"If one stopg short of urging upon others that it is their
duty or to their interest to resist the law, it seems to me
that one should not be held to have attempted to cause its
violation. If that be not the test, I can see no escape from
the conclusion that, under this section, every political agitation which can be shown to ·he apt to create a seditious
temper is illegru. I am confident that by such language Congress. had no such revolutionary purpose in view."82

Judge Rogers, however, in the Circuit Court of Appeals, took
the opposite view in the following unequivocal words:

.

..

"If the natural arid reasonable effect of what is said is
to encourage resistance to the law, and the words are used
in an endeavor to persuade to resistance, it is immaterial
that the duty to resist is not mentioned or that it is to the
interest of the person is not suggested. That one may will11 See: U. S. v. Prieth, B. 156; U. S. v. Debs, B. 155, p. 7.
In the former case, under the act of June 15, 7917, and in the latter, under the
amendment of May 18, 1918, the criminal intent is emphasized. In these cases the jury

would determine from circumstances whether the criminal intent was present.
82 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 540.
Judge Hand had already spoken as follows: "One may not counsel or advise others
to violate the law as .it stands. Words arc not only the keys of persuasion, but the
' triggers of action, and those which have no purport but to counsel the violation of the
Jaw cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the
final source of government in a democratic state • • " To counsel or advise a man to
an act is to urge upon him that it is his interest or his duty to do it. While of course,
this may be accomplished as well by indirection as expressly, since words carry the meaning that they impart, the definition is exhaustive, I think, and r shall use it. Political agi.
tation by the passions it arouses or the convictions it engenders, may in fact stimulate men
to the violation of law. Detestation of existing policies is easily transformed into forcible resistance of the authority which puts them in execution, and it would be folly to
disregard the causal relation between the two. Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as
, such, with direct incitement to violent resistance, is to disregard the tol~rance of all
methods of political, agitation which, in normal times. is a safeguard of :Cree government.
The distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought acquisition in the fight
for freedom, and the purpose to disregard it must be evident when the power exists.
Ibid., p. 540. See also U. S. v. Zimmerman, Nelles, p. 14; U. S. v. Hitt, B. 53;
U. S. v. Pundt, B. 82.
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fully obstruct the enlistment service, without advising in
direct language against enlistments and without stating that
to refrain from enlistment is a duty or is in one's interest,
seems to us too plain for controversy."88
It would seem that the Supreme Court of the United States in
the Debs Case endorsed the position taken by Judge Rogers. After
reviewing the speech, Justice Holmes said:
"If that rthe obstruction of the recruiting service] was
intended and if, in all the circumstances, that would have
been the probable effect, it would not have been protected
by reason of its being part of a general program and an
expression of a general and conscientious belief."SS&

It is the criminal intent, then, that is emphasized, and the intent
is to be determined by the jury in every case.
The third offense covered by the amendment consists in willfully uttering "profane, scurrilous or a:busive language about the
form of government of the United States, the flag of the United
States or the military or naval forces of the United States. or any
language intended to bring them into contempt, scorn, contumely,
or disrepute." Obviously, the intent qualifies the entire crime.
Thus, Judge Sanford, in a charge to the jury, asks:
"Now, if he used the language (admitted to be profane
and abusive), did he use it intending thereby to bring the
military forces . . . into contempt, disrepute or scorn ?"u
It is interesting to note in connection with this clause· that abuse
of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy, if profane, etc., and uttered with the intent forbidden by
the statute, would probably be punishable under this statute.85
The fourth crime consists in "willfully uttering language intended
to incite, provoke or encourage resistance to the United States or
to promote the cause of its enemies."
13 J.fa.rses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 38.
See also: Wharton, Criminal Law, (nth
ed.), Sec. 266; Bishop on Criminal Law, Sec. 641; Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox's C. C. 288.
13& Debs v. U. S., B. 196, p. 3.
"U. S. v. Marlin, B. i57, p. 6. See also U. S. v. Vevig, B. 162; U. S. v. Equi,

B. 172.

.

Sanford, in U. S. v. Marlin, B. 157, p. 6, said: "I charge you that a statement made concerning the President in his capacity as Commander·in·Chiei of the Army
and Navy would be a statement made concerning the military and naval forces within the
meaning of the statute.''
It was feared by many at the time of the adoption of this amendment that the law
would prevent criticism of the President.
11 Judge
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What is meant by "resistance"? Judge Bean, in defining the
term, says:
"The element of direct, active opposition by quasi-forcible
means is required to. constitute the offense of resisting the
United States under this provision of the law."
He then defines "promote" thus :
"To promote means to help, to give aid, assistance to the
enemies of the United States in waging the war. The cause
of the enemies of the United States means any and all of
their military measures taken or carried on for the purpose
of winning the war against the United States."86
The crime of displaying the flag of any foreign enemy is too
clear to need discussion. It is taken to be an evidence of disloyalty and punished as such.
The willful advocacy of the curtailment of production in the
country of products essential to the prosecution of the war is also
made illegal by this amendment, i~ the intent is to hinder the United
States in the prosecution of the war. 87 The clause is plainly adapted
to .Punishing individuals who, under guise of advocating a better
policy, advise the slackening up in the manufacture or production
of war material. The next crime demands no discussion; it is evident that, where acts themselves are illegal, the willful advocacy
of them may also be made so.
The l.!1st crime mentioned in this section is the supporting or
favoring the cause of any country with which the United States
""U. S. v. Marie Equi, B. 172, p. 14.
curtailment of production by violence is dealt with by the: Sabotage Act,
April :zo, 1918 (Report of the Attorney General, 1918, p. 677) as follows:
Sec. :z. "That when the United States is at war, whoever with intent to injure, in·
terfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or
Clltrying on war, or whoever, with reason to believe that his act may injure, interfere
with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carrying
on war, shall willfully injure or destroy or shall attempt to so injure or destroy, any war
material, 'l\·ar lpremises, or war utilities. as herein defined, shall, upon conviction thereof,
he fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both."
Sec. 3. "That when the United States is at war, whoever, with intent to injure,
interfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or
carrying on the war, or whoever, with reason to believe that his act may injure, inter·
fere with or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carry·
ing on the war, shall willfully make or cause to be made in a defective manner, or at·
tempt to make or cause to be made in a defective manner, any war material, as herein
defined, or any tool, implement, machine, utensil or receptacle, used or employed in
making, producing, manufacturing, or repairing any such war material, as herein defined,
shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not
more than 30 years, or both."
BT The
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is at war, or by word or act opposing the cause of the United States
therein. Interpreting this clause, Judge Munger says.:
"To favor the cause of any enemy country under this
statute means that what is said supports the object and purpose of the enemy in the war; that which the enemy seeks
to attain. And to oppose the cause of the United States
means that one by his words is opposing the object of the
United States in this war." 88
There has been much discussion whether this clause prohibits
criticism of the conduct of the war. The language of one judge
on this point is as follows:
"The law does not forbid differences of opinion or reasonable discussion as to the causes which induced Congress
to declare war, or as to the results to be attained by the war,
or at the end of the war, nor the time and conditions under
which the war should be brought to an end, nor any reasonable and tempered discussions and differences of opinion
upon any or all of the measures or policies adopted in carrying on the war. The law is limited to making it a crime to
oppose by word or act the military measures taken by the
United States or under lawful authority by the officers of
the United States for the purpose of prosecuting the war
to a successful end." 811
Such an interpretation cannot, I think, be considered other than
moderate and necessary under the existing. conditions.90
U. S. v. Bunyard, B. 168, p. 4.
• U. S. v. Marie Equi, B. 172, p. 15. See also U. S. v. Brackl'lt, B. 170; U. S,
v. Bunyard, B. 168.
90 Perhaps this careful limitation of the terms of the amendment was due largely to
the Attorney General. who required the submission of the, facts to the department before
a case was instituted. These instructions are contained in the report cf ·the Attorney
General (1918), p. 674.
Some criticism was directed at the Attorney General for urging the people to report
violations of the Act, on the ground that such an invitation gave opportunity to cause
trouble for personal reasons. The criticism was just (see Report of Attorney General,
19r8, p. 673). Recently, however, the department has announced the policy of accept·
ing reports of villlations of the law only from its own investigators.
In 1918, 988 cases were commenced under the Act. 366 convictions followed, while
Si' were acquitted, 51 discontinued, 21 dismissed or 1C1.uashed. 197 pleas of guilty were
entered, 222 trials by jury were held and 496 were pending at the close of the year.
The fines of these amounted to $163,843.89. (Report of Attorney General, 1918, p. 156.)
That of the 363 convictions there were 197 pleas of guilty shows that there were comparatively few cases in which there could have been an error in judging the facts. The
injustice which certain papers, such as the Nation, are charging against the department
could scarcely be said to have been very great. Certainly the benefits in checkin"g utter·
11
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As was said above, it is an elementary rule of construction that
a law must be construed so as to bring it within constitutional limitations.91 We have just seen what scope the courts have been
ready to accord the Espionage Act; but it will still be in place to
consider some more direct expressions upon the constitutional question raised by the Act in relation to the First Amendment. Judge
Neterer stated the general principle involved as follows:
"All citizens are free to express their views on all public
questions so long as they are actuated by honest purposes
and not for the purpose of transgressing the rights of others,
the laws of the states, or obstructing by force the execution
of the laws of the United States; but no person has a right
to convert the liberty of speech into a license or to carry it
to a point wher,e it interferes with the due execution of the
law, where his opposition is not honest, and where he is
not actuated by an intention of expressing his views, but is
manifested py an intent to violate the rights of others or
the laws of the United States."92
Somewhat more specifically, hvo general limitations upon freedom of speech are recogtiized as having been imposed by the Espionage Act to prevent liberty's becoming license.
In the first place, one is forbidden to advise another to resist a
law of the United States; and one who a:buses his right of free
speech to this extent must, say the courts, take the consequences
of his own temerity. In the words of Judge Wolverton:
"Neither the right of the citizen to resort to the courts
for redress of his grievances nor his right to free speech as
guaranteed by the Constitution confers any right, in the exerances that might have obstructed our war efforts and in removing the dangers of mob
violence (such as the Praeger case), which was apt to rise so long as the people felt
that disloyalty was unchecked, have outweighed the evils of the law.
The Supreme Court on review has thrown some of these cases out for lack of evidence. No doubt the convictions had followed events that had inflamed the minds of the
jury, or perhaps the charges to the jury were in too broad terms. See Emanuel Balzer
et aL, B. 3.
Clarence Waldron and others have had their sentences reduced by the executive (see
trial, B. 79). Fred Krafft was pardoned by the President (case, B. 6 and 74). There
are 150 other cases under review by the Department of Justice (see Phila. Ledger, March
5, 1919). Fifty-one have been recommended for executive clemency, and their cases
are now before the President (April 12, 1919).
91 The Abby Dodge (1912), 223 U. S. 166; U. S. v. Del. & H. Co. (1,,909), 213 U. S.
366; Harrima.n v. Interstate Com. Comm. (1908), 211 U. S. 407; Knights T. I. Co. v.
Jarman (1902), 187 U. S. 197; James v. Bowman (1903), 190 lJ. S. 127.
c U. S. v. Hulet M. Wells, B. 70, p. 8. See also: U. S. v. Benedict Prielh, B. 156;
U. S. v. Olivereauz, B. 40; U. S. v. Frohwerk, B. 128; State v. Pape, 90 Conn., 98.
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cise of these great privileges, to use them as a medium through
which to wantonly resist or obstruct the execution of the
laws."93
In the second place, the law forbids one to make false statements
that tend to injure the United States. If we deny the government
the power of suppressing the distribution of false statements made
with intent to destroy the morale and efficiency of the armies when
engaged in warfare and to prevent or interfere with their lawful
organization and recruiting, we deny it the power of self-preservation.94
But the courts also justify the action of the Government in passing the Espionage Act on the ground that greater restrictions had
already been placed upon the press without infringing upon its rights.
Judge Ray's argument on this point is as follows:
"In the United States v. Toledo Newspaper Co. [220 Fed.
458] it is held that the constitutional guarantee of the free-

dom of the press is not infringed by summary process and
conviction for contempt for publications tending to obstruct
the administration of justice. If this be correct,.. why may
not Congress enact a law making it an offense to make and
spread broadcast, when a state of war exists, pamphlets containing materially false statements which are intended to
interfere with and obstruct the lawful raising and organization of armies and military operations of the Government,
and which pamphlets are calculated to have that effect?" 95
Looking .at the question from a different angle, Judge Hough
argues in Friana v. U. S., that the Espionage Act does not restrict
the freedom of speech and press at all as these are known to the
Constitution. His language is as follows:
"The :f.ree speech secured federally zy the First Amendment means complete immunity for the publication by speech
or print of whatever is not harmful in character when tested
by such standards as the law affords. For these standards
we must look to the common law rules in force when the
Constitutional guarantees were established and in reference
to w~ich they were adopted.
91 U. S. v. Flo;yrJ Ramp, B. 66, p • .t (Quoted). See alse>: U. S. v. Sugarman, B. 12;
U. S. v. Baker, 247 Fed. 124; U. S. v. O'Hare, B. 49.
" Paraphrased from U. S. v. Clinton H. Pierce, B. 15, p. 6. See also Turner v.

Williams, 194 U. S. 279 •
.., U. S. v. Clinton H. Pitrce, B. r 5, p. 5.
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"By legislative action the boundaries of unpunishable
speech have doubtless and often been enlarged, but the constitutional limits remain unchanged and what the legislature
has done it can undo.
"Legal talk-liberty never has meant, however, the unrestricted right to say what one pleases at all times and under
all circumstances."95 •
In short, freedom of speech and the press are not abridged unconstitutionally as long as tliey are not restricted- by statute more
severely than they were at the common law.
Finally, the doctrine of paramount necessity was invoked by
Judge Lewis as follows:
''You are instructed that this guarantee cannot be successfully invoked as a protection ~here the honor and safety
of the nation is involved."98
· More recently the Supreme Court itself has passed upon the
question in the Schenk and Debs Cases. Sustaining the conviction
of Schenk, Justice Holmes, speaking for the unanimous Bench,
said:
·
"We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the
defendant in saying all that was said in the circular would
have been within his constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it ~as done. The most stringent protection 9f free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting 'Fire I' in a
theater and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that have all the
effect of force. The question in each case is whether the
words were used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and. present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When·
a nation is at war many things that might be said in time
of peace are such a hindrance to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no
court could regard them ·as protected by any constitutional
right." 97 .
... U. S. v. Nearing, B. 792, p. + See a!So Cooley Principles of Constitutional Law,
3rd ed., p. :z99 ff.
"' iJ. S. v. Tantter, B. 56, p. 3. See also U. S. v. Capo, B. 37 (The subservicncy
of Blackstone's definition of freedom of the press to the war powers is here laid down distinctly, p. 8). See further U. S. v. Debs, B. 155; U. S. v. Doe, B. 55.
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v.
CONSPIRACY.

Complementary to Section 3 of the Espionage Act is Section 4,
which penalizes consp.iracy to do the acts forbidden by the earlier
section. It reads as follows:
"If two or more persons conspire to violate the provisions
of Sections two or three of this title, and one or more of
such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each party to the conspiracy shall be punished as
in said sections provided in the case of the doing of the act
the accomplishment of which is the object of the conspiracy.
Except as a:bove provided conspiracies to commit offenses
under this title shall be punished as provided for by Section
37 of the Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws
of the United States, approved March 4th, 1909."98
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to
do an unlawful act ;99 and when persons agree understandingly to
accomplish an unlawful purpose there is a conspiracy though no
word is spoken between them regarding it.100
But in addition to the agreement there must be an overt act,
though it is not necessary that the purpose of the conspiracy should
have been accomplished.101
The method of proof of a conspiracy is dealt with by Judge
Youmans in the following passage:
"The existence of a conspiracy may be shown either by
direct or positive evidence, such as declarations or writings,
or ·by circumstantial evidence showing that the parties
charged acted in concert or in a manner or under circumstances warranting the inference that their acts were the
result o~ previous understanding or agreement between
them."
And once a conspiracy is formed, all the conspirators are recognized as principals, "although the part that some of them took
therein is a minor or subordinate one, or is to be executed separately
or at a distance from the other participaµts." 102
rr Schenk v. U. S., B. 194, p. 3.
'"Stat. 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 219 (1917).
" U. S. v. Balzer, B. 3, p. 3. See also U. S. v. Schenk, B. 43.
100 U. S. v. Balzer, B. 3, p. 4.
101 U. S. v. Schenk, B. 43, p. 5·
1 "' U. S. v. Balzer, B. 3, p. 5.
The object of the conspiracy does not have to be
carried out. Justice Holmes (Schenk v. U. S., B. 194), says: "If the act • • • its ten·
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It is evident, therefore, that any agreement of persons, in furtherance of which there has been any overt act,~ to do any of the
things prohibited by Section 3 of the Espionage Act, would constitute a conspiracy and would ~e punishable under the law, provided the acts themselves were constitutionally prohibited; for if
the acts themselves are constitutionally prohibited, there can be no
reasonable doubt that a conspiracy to do them may be constitutionally prohibited.

VI.
TREASON.

If Congress had not enacted the Espionage Act or some equivalent
measure, it is likely that the Government would have had frequent
recourse, .in endeavoring .to repress disloyalty, to the statutes punishing treason, and that consequently the constitutional definition· of
treason would hav~ received further elucidation from the Courts.
This definition reads :

"Treason against the United States shall consist only in
levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted
of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the
same overt act, or on confession in open court."103
The terms here used need occupy us only briefly. Treason by
"levying war against the United States" is treason by insurrection
or rebellion ; hence this part of the Constitutioµal definition does not
concern us in this place.
The term "enemies" as used in the second clause applies, we are
authoritatively informed, only to the citizens or subjects of a belligerent power in a state of hostilities with us; while "adhering" to such
enemies is a state of mind to be inferred from the giving them aid
and comfort.1°'
dem:y, and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for
saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime."
10a Art. II, Sec. III, par. l.
~°' ll. S. v. Greatlwuse, .a6 Fed. Cas. No. 15254· Giving aid and comfort is said to
embrace "any act clearly indicating a Jack of loyalty to the Government, and which, by
fair construction, is directly in furtherance of hostile designs." 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18372:
An examination· of previous cases will indicate what specific actions have been held
to constitute treason within this clause:
(a) Trading with the enemy government, its agents or forces, whether for gain or
for the purpose of aiding the enemy, if the natural consequence is. that the enemx Will
receive benefit.
(b) Communication of military intelligence.
·
(c) Joining the enemy in time of war, or offering service by letter. U. S. v.
Greiner, Fed. Cas. No. 15262.
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The really interesting question from the point of view of our
present inquiry is whether utterances, spoken or written, can ever
constitute treason. Opinion on this point was in some confusion
before the war began and it can hardly be said to have been cleared
up by sub5equent developments. Thus, in a charge to a jury, delivered in 1861, Justice Nelson of the United States Supreme Court
said:
"Words oral, written, or printed, however treasonable, do
not constitute an overt act of treason within the definition of
the crime. When spoken, written or printed in relation to an
act or acts which, if coi:nmitted with a treasonable design,
might constitute such overt act, they are admissible as evi~
dence tending to characterize it, and to show the intent with
which the act was committed. They also furnish some evidence of the act itself against the accused. This is the extent
to whic4 such publications may be used-either in finding a
bill of indictment or on the trial of it."105
Five years earlier, however, Justice Curtis had held that in the
case of treason by levying war, inciting others to rebellion was
treasonable even though the agitator was not present in person at
the act of war. 106
The one case which has arisen during the present war involving
the question under discussion is that of the editors of the
PHILADELPHIA TAGEBLATT, who were indicted for uttering publications favorable to Germany and inimical to the United States. The
(d) Delivering up prisoners and deserters to the enemy. U. S. Y. Ilodges, 26 Fed.
Cas. No. 15374·
(e) Acts directed against the government or government property with the intent
to c:ause injury thereto and in aid of the enemy.
(f) Acts which tend and are: designed to weaken our arms.
(g) Advising, inciting, and persuading others to give aid and comfort to the enemy.
The outlines hen: given are taken from Charles Warren, "What is Giving Aid and
Comfort to the Enerliy", Yale Law Journal, Jan., 1918, and L. C. Bradley, "Essay on
Disloyalty", Princeton, 1918 (unpublished).
1oo 5 Blatchford 549, 550.
Senator Brandagt"e, however, in the debate on the Espionage Act, saiil:
"H a newspaper shall publish information, when the United States is at war, which
gives aid and comfort fo the enemy, it would be treason." C. R., 65th Cong., lst Sess.,
p. 763.
Since the death penalty was provided by the Espionage Act for this crime we may
say that such action is equivalent to treason in effect and in law (Title I, Sec. 2).
Mr. Davison of New York contends that the utterance of either written or spoken
words is as much an overt act as is any deed, and that the doing or saying or writing
anything which tends to hearten or encourage the enemy is as much within the consti·
tutional provision as the rendering of material physical aid to the enemy would be.
Pamphlet on "Treason", p. 5.
'°' l.l. S. ,•• Greathouse, Fed. Cas. No. 15254.
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articles stigmatized as treasonable were classified by the Govern•
ment's attorney under the following captions:
(I)
( 2)
(3)
( 4)
(5)
(6)

(7)

Glorification of German strength and success
Discouraging enlistments
Attacking the sll,icerity of the United States
Obstructing our war measures
Commending German insurrections on this side
Attacking the Government
Falsifications 101

A. demurrer to this indictment declared that the only "overt act"
charged therein was the publication of articles indicative of disloyal sentiments, wherefore, it was contended, the editors had committed no offense of a treasonable character. Judge Dickinson
ruled, however, that the point was properly a trial question and that
the Government should be allowed to prove that aid and comfort
had been given to the--enemy.
Referring to Judge Nelson's opinion, he said:
"The opinion expressed by Judge Nelson will bear the
construction that, although words, so long as they are words
do not constitute an overt act of treason; yet when 'printed
in relation to an act or acts which if committed with a treasonable design.might constitute such overt act' they may be a
part of the treasonable intent."108
Such an act, he intimates, w.ould be the communication of intelligence of value to the enemy by printing it in the paper:
Later, too, in directing the jury to bring in a verdict of "not
gnilty," the same judge said:
"You might have a situation.in which it.would be apparent to everyone that words of incitement, words of persuasion, words of appeal~ words even that would arouse bad
emotions, which would have an effect as a train of powder
already laid, to which the minds would be likely to act as a
a spark, if that condition of affairs existed; then mere words
might constitute treason. But I call your attention to the
fact that, so far as I recall, there is no evidence in this case
of any such condition. There is nothing in this case beyond
the fact of publication."109

= Bulletin
100

42,

p.

2.

U. S. v. Louis Wenner and Martin DarkOVJ, B. 42, p.
Record, M:irch 27, 1918, p. lO, col 2.

100 Philadelphia
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It would seem that the court implied that mere words might constitute treason only if it could be clearly proved that the circumstances under which the words were uttered were such that treasonable acts of violence would inevitably follow the utterance of the
words. Such a ruling seems eminently conservative.110
CoNsT1TuT10NAI, ~r:rs.

The Espionage Act presents an old constitutional problem in a
new light. Its principal results for Constitutional Law may be
summarized thus:
110 It may be pertinent to mention here some more drastic proposals than the Espion•
;ige Act which failed of passage.
The most notable of these was a bill introduced by Senator Chamberlain of Oregon,
which ran in part as follows:
"Be it enacted, etc. • • • that, owing to changes in the conditions of modem war•
fare, whereby the enemy now att~pts to attack and injure the successful prosecution
of the war by the United States by means of civilians and other agents and supporters
behind the lines spreading false statements and propaganda, injuring and destroying the
things and utilities prepared or adapted for the use of the land and naval forces of the
United States, thus constituting the United States a part of the zone of operations con·
ducted by the enemy, any person, whether a citizen or subject of the enemy country, or
otherwise, who shall anywhere in the United States, in time of war, endanger or inter· ·
fere with the successful operation of the land or naval forces of the United States • • •
"By printing or publishing any such printed matter, shall be deemed a spy and be
subject to trial by a general court martial or by a military commission- of the army or by a
court martial of the navy, and on conviction thereof such shall suffer death or such
other punishment as said general court martial or military commission or court martial
shall direct."
·
The constitutionality of the blll is doubtful in view of the Milligan case (4 Wall),
in which it was held that martial law cannot exist "when the courts· are open and in the
proper and unobstructed exercise of their function."
The fifth Amendment, however, admits trial by other means than by jury in cases
"arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia, V11ien in actual service in time of
war or public danger."
·
Mr. Chamberlain attempted to extend this exception to propagandists whom he classed
as spies. Is this extension of the term warranted?
The 82nd Article of War makes persons found spying about certain fortified places
subject to court martial. In the Manual for Courts llfartial, it is said that the words
'any person' mean all' persons of whatever nationality or civil status.
These rulings do not cover the case in question. In order to justify the classification
of propagandists as spies, it would be necessary, probably, to show that they were in direct
communication with the enemy.
The bill was dropped, however, upon receipt of a letter from the President, in which
he attacked the constitutionality and advisability of the law.
Another bill that failed of passage provided that (1) Any organization one of whose
Pl\rposes is to effect an industriaY, social, or economic change within the United States,
without authority of law, by force is illegal.
(2) Any person in war time professing to be an officer of such an orgaclzation
shall be fined $5,000 or imprisoned.
(3) Any o.ivner, agent, etc., of any building, who during war allows an assemblage
of such persons therein shall be fined $5,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year.
(4) Any publication advocating the principles of Sec. 1 shall be excluded from the
mails.
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(I) The freedom of the press is not unlimited, but is limited by
the protective·right of the community. As Chief Justice White says
in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U.S., 247 U.S. 4I9-420:
"The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the very. basis and mainstay upon
which the freedom of the press rests, and that freedom,
therefore, does not and cannot be held to include the right
virtually to destroy such institutions. It suffices to say that,
however CC?mplete is the right of the press to state public
things and discuss them, ~hat right, as every other right en~
joyed in human society,· is subject to the restraints which
separate right from wrongdoing."
Somewhat niore specifically,. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. U. S.,
B. I94, p3, says:
·
''The question jn each case is whether the words are used
in such Circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
(2) T4e right of circulation is collateral with the right of publication. The famous dicta in the Jackson and Rapier CaseS111 must
be so interpreted; or, if they are not, they are clearly erroneous. In
any case, there is no right of circulation for matter whose utterance
.1ias been penalized constitutionally by Congress.1~2
m. E~ Parle Jackson, 96 U. S. 733 (1878). "Liberty of circulating is as essential to
that freedom as t1berty of publishing; indeed without the circulation, the publication
would be of little value. If, therefore, printed matter be excluded from the mails, its
transportation in any other way cannot be forbidden by Congress."
In re Rapier, 143 U. S. IIO (1892): "The circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the Government declines itself to become an agent in the circulation of printed
matter which it regards as injurious to the people."
It may be reiterated that in Cluunpion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, the Court carefully
avoided the question whether papers containing advertisements of lotteries could be ex·
eluded from interstate commerce.
=See ante, discussion of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act.
:m "Burleson's Attitude," New York Tribune, Mar. II, 1919; Senator Chamberlain on
"the Effect of Army Courts on Bolshevism," New York Times, Mar. II, 1919; Major
Hume, on "Revolution," New York Evening Post, Mar. II, 1919; Att!y General Palmer's
attitude, Evening Post, April 4, 1919.
l;lenator New's bill embodying this sentiment would prohioit (1) The advocacy of,
or distribution of matter tending to the "overthrow by force or violence, or by physical
injury· to person or property, or by the general cessation of industry, of the Government
of the United States."
·
(2) Display of the 11ag symbolizing such a purpose.
(3) Mailing any matter urging such steps.
(4) Importation into the United States of such mattes.
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(3) The Censorship provision was rejected by Congress out of
respect for the traditional opposition of press and people to any
form of censorship. Undoubtedly, however, it was within the power
of Congress to establish a voluntary censorship; that is, one recourse
to which was purely optional on the part of publishers. ·
(4)· Finally, the doctrine of administrative discretion has been
strengthened.
' The future of the Espionage Act is doubtful. On one hand there
is a decided demand for some such law to suppress bolshevism and
similar movements against the Govemment.113 On the other hand
there is an agitation for the removal of all restrictions upon speech
and tlie press on the ground that such restrictions ai;e no longer
necessary.1 u The result remains to be seen.
THOMAS

F. C..\RROI,I,.

Princeton, N. J.
(5) This section penalizes the breach of the law by a fine of $s,ooo or imprison·
ment for five years. The bill failed of passage.
A bill was drawn up by Major Hume, counsel for the Senate Investigating Commit·
tee, of the same import. Sections 1·4 cover almost exactly the ground covered by the
amended section 3, Title I of the Espionage Act.
Section 5 repeals Section 4 of the Espionage· Act.
Section 6 provides for the deportation of aliens violating the law.
Section 7 repeals all Jaws in conflict with the provisions of this bill. It is said that
Major Hume will have this bill introduced as soon as Congress assembles.
11'In the New Yo,.k Evening Post, March II, 1919, a statement by the Civil Liber·
tics Bureau drawa attention to the political effects of the Sedition Law of 1798, suggest•
ing that the Espionage Act is similar to this law. It is obvious that the circumstances of
the two cases arc not parallel
In the Evening Post, Mar. II, 1919, a statement of the Civil Liberties Bureau
charges that the Government is holding men convicted under the Espionage Act as politi•
cal prisoners.
The Nation leads other periodicals in a publicity campaign for the repeal of the
Espionage Act. These papers put the responsibility for the act entirely on the Democratic party and warn the Democrats that the effect is likely to be politically di~rous.
But neither party can be given full credit for the passage of the act. The Republicans
have the advantage in case the measure should be made a political issue only in the fact
that they were oppose,d to conferring power on the Postmaster General.

